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ABSTRACT 
 
Life Cycle Employment and Fertility  
Across Institutional Environments
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In this paper, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force 
participation and fertility choices and estimate approximate decision rules using data on 
married women in Italy, Spain and France. The pattern of estimated state dependence 
effects across countries is consistent with aggregate patterns in part-time employment and 
child care availability, suggesting that labor market rigidities and lack of child care options are 
important sources of state dependence. Simulations of the model reveal that Italian and 
Spanish women would substantially increase their participation rates were they to face the 
French institutional environment. 
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The growth in women￿s participation in the labor market, especially among women with
children, has been one of the most important economic and social phenomena of the last
half century. The large scale movement of women into the labor market after World War
II has occurred in many countries, but the level of female employment across countries has
not been equalized, and the diﬀerential female employment patterns across countries is not
well understood. This is true even within Western Europe. Cross-country diﬀerences in
female labor force participation and attachment within Europe have recently raised serious
concerns, particularly in the context of the European Union￿s attempt to harmonize social
policies.1
In order to try and better understand cross country diﬀerences in female employment
patterns, we formulate a dynamic utility maximization model of labor market participa-
tion and fertility choices, and estimate approximate decision rules using data on married
women in Italy, Spain and France. Limiting the set of countries to only those with "simi-
lar" cultural characteristics helps control for unobservable diﬀerences such as religion and
attitudes towards gender roles. Estimated diﬀerences in the relative importance of state
dependence and permanent unobserved heterogeneity in life cycle work and fertility choices
across these three countries are then correlated with diﬀerences in underlying institutions
governing employment and social policies.
The reason for focusing on the relative importance of state dependence and unobserved
heterogeneity in work and fertility choices in each country is that past research on female
labor force participation rates has repeatedly revealed that persistence is an important
aspect of the labor supply decisions of married women (see, e.g., Heckman and Willis (1977),
Nakamura and Nakamura (1985) a n dE c k s t e i na n dW o l p i n(1989)). Serial persistence in
participation may be due to state dependence deriving from human capital accumulation
or the costs of searching for a new job. For example, a woman leaving the labor market
1At the Lisbon summit in March 2000, the European Council stated that Member States should set
quantitative targets for higher employment rates in line with EU targets. These were set at 70% for total
employment and 60% for women￿s employment, to be reached by the year 2010. In 2001,i n t e r m e d i a t e
targets of 67% (total) and 57% (for women) were set to be reached by 2005.
2to care for a new born may be likely to remain out of the labor market the following year
because her human capital (work experience) has "depreciated". It is also possible that job
search costs increase with age and diﬀer across participation states.
Serial persistence can also be due to permanent unobserved heterogeneity which re-
￿ects diﬀerences in mostly immutable preferences for work and/or productivity in the labor
market. For example, a woman may not leave the labor market because she has strong pref-
erences for a career. In this case, the unobserved individual component determines current
participation irrespective of past participation. Unless properly accounted for, unobserved
heterogeneity leads to the possibility of spurious state dependence, in which it appears that
working in the past increases the probability of working today, when in fact causality ￿ows
from the unobservable to all period-speci￿cc h o i c e s .
Accurately distinguishing between state dependence and unobserved heterogeneity is
not only theoretically interesting, it can also be important for policy evaluation. If there
is substantial permanent unobserved heterogeneity then time spent out the labor market
around the time of childbirth will have little eﬀect on subsequent employment probabilities.
If there is substantial state dependence then having a child, which lowers participation in
the short run, will also lower future employment levels because women are not continuing to
build human capital or are missing training opportunities. In this latter case, policies aimed
at reducing fertility-related absences may reduce human capital depreciation and increase
long-run labor market attachment.
Several recent studies of female labor supply have focused on the role of state dependence
and unobserved heterogeneity (e.g., Hyslop (1999) and Carrasco (2001))b u t ,t ot h eb e s t
of our knowledge, there is no work that analyzes the diﬀerential relative importance of
these two factors across countries. In this paper, we hypothesize that in addition to human
capital accumulation and search costs, institutional factors (which make it costly to adjust
employment levels from one period to the next for agents on both sides of the market) are
important underlying sources of cross-country diﬀerences in the degree of state dependence.
We believe that the estimated variation in the relative importance of state dependence
in female labor supply across countries can, in large part, be attributed to diﬀerences in
the social policy environment, especially regarding labor market ￿exibility and child care
3availability.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we provide a brief
background on the relationship between female labor market participation and fertility
choices that motivates our model of joint decision-making. In Section 3, we describe the
data. Section 4 outlines our model of labor market participation and fertility decisions.
Section 5 discusses the estimation strategy. Section 6 presents estimation results. Section 7
relates the estimation results to the social policy environment in each country and performs
simulations which quantify the eﬀect of the institutional environment on participation and
fertility outcomes. The simulations indicate that Italian and Spanish women would sub-
stantially increase their participation rates were they to face the relatively more ￿exible
French employment and child care environment. The last section of the paper summarizes
and concludes.
2B a c k g r o u n d
In research on female labor supply behavior, the vast majority of empirical studies ￿nd a
negative eﬀect of fertility on labor supply. However, the eﬀect may not be causal. The nega-
tive correlation may be the result of selection eﬀects where women with stronger preferences
for motherhood are also those with lower unobservable skills and motivation in the labor
market. Using cross sectional data, Mroz (1987) tested the sensitivity of the parameters
of the labor supply equation of married women with respect to a number of assumptions,
including the exogeneity of fertility. He concludes that conditional on participation, fertility
is exogenous to women￿s labor supply. However, using panel data, Jakubson (1988) arrives
at the opposite conclusion. His results reject the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis.
The potential endogeneity of fertility has also been addressed by adopting an instrumen-
tal variables methodology. In searching for instruments, researchers have looked at sources
of unplanned births (e.g., the presence of twins (Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980)), and the
availability and cost of contraceptives (Rosenzweig and Schultz (1985)). Angrist and Evans
(1998) suggest the use of the sibling-sex composition as an instrumental variable, given the
plausible exogeneity of sibling-sex composition and the observed correlation between hav-
4ing two children of the same sex and further childbearing. However, this latter approach
is particularly diﬃcult to implement using European data since the number of women in
Europe with at least two children is typically very small. The main challenge confronting
the IV empirical strategy has, not surprisingly, been one of ￿nding suitable instruments.
On a somewhat diﬀerent track, and more in line with the suggestions of Browning (1992),
Hyslop (1999) studies the relationship between participation and fertility by estimating dy-
namic discrete choice models of female labor force participation. His results indicate that
when dynamic factors in female labor supply are excluded, fertility is not exogenous. How-
ever, in dynamic speci￿cations with serially correlated errors and/or lagged participation
outcomes, he ￿nds no evidence against the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis. One drawback
of Hyslop￿s approach is that he excludes the possibility of interactions between the partic-
ipation history and fertility as well as a speci￿c (linear) correlation structure between the
explanatory variables and the unobservables.
It thus seems fair to say that economists￿ ability to explain the link between participation
and fertility has been decidedly limited. In particular, the diﬃculty of ￿nding suitable
instruments and the very mixed results when testing the exogeneity of fertility hypothesis
strongly suggests that fertility decisions should be examined in a more realistic manner, in
which the jointness of fertility and labor market participation decisions is directly taken
into account (as in Moﬃtt (1984), Hotz and Miller (1988), Francesconi (2002),D e lB o c a
(2002), and Laroque and Salanie (2005)).
In this paper, we follow this latter approach by considering labor supply and fertility
decisions as being jointly planned over the life-cycle. Labor market participation and fer-
tility decision rules are simultaneously determined in our model, in the sense that they are
generated by a common constrained lifetime utility maximization problem. We estimate the
(approximate) decision rules of the utility maximization model by linking it with a dynamic
bivariate probit model with a rich error structure. We then use the estimated approximate
decision rules to infer the eﬀect of institutional factors related to employment and social
polices on the joint labor market participation and fertility choices of married women.
53D a t a
The data used in this study are drawn from the European Community Household Panel
(ECHP). The ECHP is a standardized multi-purpose longitudinal survey designed and
coordinated by the Statistical Oﬃce of the European Communities (Eurostat). The survey
is conducted annually on a representative panel of households in each member state of the
European Union (EU). The survey covers a wide range of topics on living conditions such
as income, employment, poverty and social exclusion, housing, health and migration. The
unit of analysis in the ECHP is the family, and information is gathered on all individuals
within the household that are sixteen years of age or older. Nonetheless, it is also possible
to recover information on family members that are younger than sixteen.
The ECHP began in 1994 (wave 1), following a two-wave pilot survey. Wave 1 covered
about 60,000 households and 130,000 individuals in all twelve EU member states (Belgium,
Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal,
Spain and the UK). Austria joined the survey in 1995 (wave 2), Finland joined in 1996
(wave 3) and Sweden joined in 1997 (wave 4). The last year the ECHP was administered
was 2002 (wave 9). Eurostat terminated the project in 2003 and replaced it with a new
instrument, the EU-SILC (Statistics on Income and Living Conditions), in order to focus
more attention on the determinants of poverty and social exclusion.
We analyze ECHP data from Italy, Spain and France, between the years 1994 and 2001
(waves 1 through 8). Italy, Spain and France constitute a natural subgroup of countries
within the EU because of common cultural environments (e.g., majority religion and at-
titudes towards gender roles). Importantly, for our purposes, these countries have similar
cultural characteristics but diﬀer substantially in social policies related to labor market
￿exibility and child care availability.
The sample from each country that we analyze contains women who are between the
ages of 21 and 45, who are continuously married or cohabitant with partners that are
continuously employed throughout the sample period, and who have complete employment
and fertility histories. These restrictions are quite common in the female labor supply
literature. They exclude women who might still be enrolled in school or retired and who
have a low probability of being fecund. The restriction that all women have complete
6employment and fertility histories excludes women in the ECHP who could not be contacted
or refused to cooperate subsequent to being interviewed in wave 1,a sw e l la sw o m e nw h o
entered the survey after wave 1.2 The sample contains 830 women from Italy, 713w o m e n
from Spain and 993 women from France.
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics on employment patterns by country. The means
in the table are calculated by ￿rst computing average values over the eight-year panel for
each woman, and then calculating averages over the number of women in the sample.3 The
statistics show large diﬀerences in female education levels between countries. For example,
in Italy only 8% of the women have tertiary education levels, while in Spain and France the
proportions are much higher, 20% and 28%, respectively. The proportion of women whose
youngest child in the household is 3 years old or younger is similar in Italy and Spain but
relatively higher in France. France also has the highest mean annual partner￿s earnings (in
thousands of Euros), female labor market participation rate, and annual birth rate. The
raw data display a positive correlation across countries in work and fertility outcomes.
Table 1 also compares the means of women who do not work all eight years and those
who do work all eight years. In all three countries, women who always work are more highly
educated and are less likely to have a child in the house than those who never work. Thus,
there is the expected negative correlation between fertility and labor supply within each
country. Note that the majority of the sample in each country consists of women who either
work all eight years or never work. In each country, mean annual partner￿s earnings are
higher amongst women who always work suggesting a complicated non-labor income eﬀect.
In order to get a better picture of changes over time, Figures 1 and 2 display patterns
in annual labor market participation rates and annual birth rates over the sample period in
each country. Figure 1 illustrates that participation rates over the sample period are always
highest in France, second highest in Italy, and lowest in Spain. However, participation
rates in Spain converge to those in Italy, while Italian participation rates remain mostly
2Nicoletti and Peracchi (2003) analyze the determinants of non-response in the ECHP. They ￿nd that
attrition after wave 1 is mostly due to migration. Individuals that entered the ECHP after wave 1 were
likely to be out of the scope of the survey at that time.
3Birth outcomes in the eigth year (wave 8) of the survey are not observed due to a censoring problem.
7constant. French participation rates display more ￿uctuation than do those of Italy and
Spain, suggesting the importance of controlling for year eﬀects.
Figure 2 graphically illustrates that birth rates are consistently highest in France over
the sample period. Spanish birth rates start out quite high, actually exceeding those in
France as well as Italy in 1995, but fall relatively rapidly over time (as participation rates
increase). Towards the end of the sample period Spanish birth rates roughly equalize with
those in Italy, and both are nearly half the birth rates in France. The birth rates in each
c o u n t r yf a l lo v e rt i m ea st h ew o m e ni nt h es a m p l ea g e .
The persistence in female labor supply is illustrated in Table 2, which displays the
distribution of years worked over the sample period, separately by country. In Italy, the
proportion of women who always work and who never work are quite similar, 36% and 39%,
respectively. These two modal points account for three-quarters of the distribution. In
Spain, relatively less women always work than in Italy, 21%, but more women never work,
46%. The percentages in France are quite diﬀerent: a larger proportion of women always
work, 45%, and a smaller proportion never work ,17%. In all three countries, the two modal
points in the distribution are at the ￿corners￿.4
Strong persistence in labor supply is also displayed in Table 3, which presents, by coun-
try, average rates of transition between employment states from year t-1 to year t. The
transition rates illustrate that, in France, it is more common for a women to move from
nonparticipation to participation than from participation to nonparticipation. In Spain, the
opposite is true. In Italy, these two types of transitions occur with equal probability. The
diagonals of the transition matrices also suggest that there is an important relationship be-
tween persistence and participation: more persistence is associated with lower participation
rates.5
4The descriptive statistics in Tables 1 and 2 can be readily compared to similar statistics for the US
reported in Hyslop (1999), and for Germany reported in Croda and Kyriazidou (2004). For example, in
both the US and Germany, women who always work are more educated and also have fewer young children
than those who never work, but they have lower mean nonlabor income. In the PSID, 48% of married women
i nt h es a m p l ea l w a y sw o r k( 11% never work) while in the GSEOP the proportion is 38.5% (15% never work).
5Analyzing gender gaps in unemployment, Azmat, Guell, and Manning (2004), have shown that in Italy
and Spain, where more women are unemployed relative to men, females are more likely to move from
84M o d e l
In this section we develop a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor supply
and birth decisions that guides the empirical work that follows. The model is similar to the
decision framework in Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) and Francesconi (2002), however, since
we estimate approximate decision rules rather than exact decision rules, our approach more
closely resembles that in Keane and Wolpin (2001a).
Consider a married women i who maximizes remaining discounted lifetime utility by
c h o o s i n g ,i ne a c hy e a rt, whether or not to participate in the labor market, hit, and whether
or not to give birth, bit. We abstract from the part-time, full-time (hours) margin and
fertility complications/timing issues by assuming that planned live births can occur with
certainty within the same year t.
Remaining lifetime utility at time t for woman i is given by
Vit (Sit)= m a x
{hit,bit}
E
"
T X
t=τ
δτ−tUit (hit,b it)|Sit
#
(1)
where τ is the theoretical start of the decision process, T is the end of the decision horizon,
δ is the subjective discount factor, and Sit is the state space at time t. Vit (Sit) is the value
function and Uit (hit,b it) is the utility ￿ow.
The maximization problem in (1) c a nb ec a s ti nt e r m so fa l t e r n a t i v es p e c i ￿cv a l u e
functions, V bh
it (Sit), that follow Bellman￿s equation, i.e.,
Vit(Sit)=m a x
£
V 00
it (Sit),V10
it (Sit),V01
it (Sit),V11
it (Sit)
⁄
V hb
it (Sit)=Uit (hit,b it)+δE(Vi,t+1(Si,t+1)|hit,b it,S it), t<T (2)
= UiT (hiT,b iT), t = T.
where the utility ￿ow is assumed to be
Uit (hit,b it)=Cit +
‡
γ0h + γ1hCit + γ2hhi,t−1 + γ3hNit + εh
it
·
hit +
‡
γ0b + εb
it
·
bit. (3)
employment to unemployment and less likely to enter from unemployment to employment, compared to
males.
9γ0h in (3) is the marginal utility of working in year t, which could be negative if there is
a utility cost to work eﬀort. Cit is current period consumption and γ1h measures the ex-
tent to which the marginal utility of consumption varies with participation status. Lagged
participation, hi,t−1,a ﬀects current period utility and γ2h captures the cost of adjusting
participation status. Nit i st h en u m b e ro fc h i l d r e ni nt h eh o u s e h o l da n dγ3h is the mar-
ginal utility of an additional child when participating in the labor market relative to not
participating. Nit follows the law of motion
Ni,t+1 = Nit + bit. (4)
γ0b is the marginal utility (or disutility) of giving birth in year t,a n dεh
it and εb
it are shocks
to the utility of working and giving birth, respectively.
The per-period budget constraint in the maximization problem is assumed to be
y
f
ithit + ym
it = Cit + CnNit (5)
where y
f
it is the woman￿s labor market earnings in year t and ym
it is the partner￿s labor
market earnings (non-labor income). Cn represents the goods-cost per child.
After substituting (5) and (4) into (3), the four utility ￿ows relevant for the correspond-
ing alternative speci￿c value functions V bh
it (Sit) become
Uit (0,0) = ym
it − CnNit
Uit (1,0) = γ0h +( 1+γ1h)y
f
it +( 1+γ1h)ym
it +( γ3h − (1 + γ1h)Cn)Nit
+γ2hhi,t−1 + εh
it (6)
Uit (0,1) = γ0b + ym
it − Cn (Nit +1 )+εb
it
Uit (1,1) = (γ0h + γ0b)+( 1+γ1h)y
f
it +( 1+γ1h)ym
it
+(γ3h − (1 + γ1h)Cn)(Nit +1 )+γ2hhi,t−1 + εh
it + εb
it.
Further, let the female earnings functions be
y
f
it = g
‡
x0
it,H it,ε
f
it
·
(7)
where g(•) is an unspeci￿ed function of the covariate vector, x0
it, accumulated actual work
experience during the sample period, Hit, and a productivity shock, ε
f
it. The vector of
10covariates x0
it contains proxies for accumulated human capital prior to the start of the
sample period. That is, x0
it =
'
Eiτi,a iτi,a 2
iτi
“
where Eiτi is the education level at the start
of the sample period for individual i, t = τi,a n daτi is the woman￿s age at t = τi.6 aiτi
and a2
iτi control for accumulated (potential) work experience prior to t = τi. Accumulated
(actual) work experience during the sample period follows the follows the law of motion
Hi,t+1 = Hit + hit. (8)
The initial condition is Hiτi =0 .7
Assuming no serial correlation in the error terms ε
f
it, εh
it and εb
it, (6) and (7) imply
that the set of state variables, Shb
it , corresponding to each choice combination is distinct.
Speci￿cally,
S00
it = {Nit,y m
it }
S10
it =
n
Nit,h i,t−1,x 0
it,H it,y m
it ,ε
f
it,ε h
it
o
(7)
S01
it =
n
Nit,ym
it ,ε b
it
o
S11
it =
n
Nit,h i,t−1,x 0
it,H it,y m
it ,ε
f
it,ε h
it,ε b
it
o
.
In the case of serial correlation, which we consider in estimation, the Shb
it ￿s are simply
augmented with the past values of the error terms.
Note that even though Shb
it ￿s in (7) diﬀer by choice combination, the decision rules of
the optimization problem depend on the entire state space, Sit, as indicated in (1) and (2).
This is because the value of a particular choice combination is computed by comparing the
values of all choice combinations. Sit is the union of S00
it , S10
it , S01
it ,a n dS11
it , and each choice
probability is a function of Sit rather than the corresponding subset Shb
it in (7).
To see this more clearly, consider, without loss of generality, the myopic version of the
m o d e l .I nt h em y o p i cv e r s i o no ft h em o d e lt h e r ei sn of u t u r ec o m p o n e n tt ot h ea l t e r n a t i v e
6The ￿r s tp e r i o do fo b s e r v e dd a t a(t = τi) for each woman will generally not be the start of the theoretical
decision process for all individuals, t = τ. How we deal with this initial conditions problem will be described
in more detail below.
7For identi￿cation purposes, y
m
it is not further speci￿ed and will appear directly in the estimating equa-
tions as a measure of nonlabor income (in logs).
11speci￿c value functions, i.e., δ =0 .8 Denote dhb
it =1if alternative (hit,b it) is chosen and
dhb
it =0 , otherwise. Per-period utility maximization implies the following comparison of
utility ￿ows in period t,
d00
it =1 if and only if Uit (0,0) − max[Uit (1,0),U it (0,1),U it (1,1)] = F00
it (Sit) > 0
=0 otherwise
d10
it =1 if and only if Uit (1,0) − max[Uit (0,0),U it (0,1),U it (1,1)] = F10
it (Sit) > 0
=0 otherwise (8)
d01
it =1 if and only if Uit (0,1) − max[Uit (0,0),U it (1,0),U it (1,1)] = F01
it (Sit) > 0
=0 otherwise
d11
it =1 if and only if Uit (1,1) − max[Uit (0,0),U it (1,0),U it (0,1)] = F11
it (Sit) > 0
=0 otherwise
Estimation of approximate decision rules, in either myopic or dynamic versions of the
model, simply involves choosing a particular speci￿cation for Pr
¡
Fhb
it (Sit) > 0
¢
. The con-
tribution of the optimization model is to provide a theoretical grounding for the common
set of covariates, Sit, that appears in estimating equations. For the dynamic utility maxi-
mization model speci￿ed above, Sit,i s
Sit =
n
Nit,h i,t−1,x 0
it,H it,ym
it ,ε
f
it,ε h
it,ε b
it
o
. (9)
5 Estimation
In this section, we detail our empirical strategy for estimating the approximate decision
rules of the dynamic optimization problem described above. In the ￿rst subsection, we
develop the connection between the approximate decision rules and a dynamic bivariate
probit model with nonparametric correlated random eﬀects and AR(1) serially correlated
transitory errors. In the second subsection, we outline the simulated maximum likelihood
(SML) algorithm used to estimate the empirical model.
8In the dynamic version of the model, each alternative speci￿c value function at time t has Sit as an
argument by virtue of the fact that the expected maximum future returns component compares the values
of all choice combinations in the future.
125.1 A Dynamic Bivariate Probit with Nonparametric Correlated Random
Eﬀects and AR(1) Errors
We estimate the approximate decision rules of the optimization problem developed in the
previous section by specifying Pr
¡
Fhb
it (Sit) > 0
¢
in the following way,
Pr
¡
d00
it =1
¢
=P r
¡
F00
it (Sit) > 0
¢
=
Z 0
−∞
Z 0
−∞
f (H∗
it (Sit),B∗
it (Sit))dH∗
itdB∗
it
Pr
¡
d10
it =1
¢
=P r
¡
F10
it (Sit) > 0
¢
=
Z ∞
0
Z 0
−∞
f (H∗
it (Sit),B∗
it (Sit))dH∗
itdB∗
it (10)
Pr
¡
d01
t =1
¢
=P r
¡
F01
it (Sit) > 0
¢
=
Z 0
−∞
Z ∞
0
f (H∗
it (Sit),B∗
it (Sit))dH∗
itdB∗
it
Pr
¡
d11
t =1
¢
=P r
¡
F11
it (Sit) > 0
¢
=1−
X
hb∈{(00),(10),(01)} Pr
‡
Fhb
it (Sit) > 0
·
where f (•) is the bivariate normal density. The choice probabilities in (10) are those of a
bivariate probit model.9
H∗
it and B∗
it in (10) are assumed to be the following functions of the state space Sit from
the optimization model,
H∗
it = α0h + α1hNi,t−1 + α2hhi,t−1 + α3hHi,t−1 + α4hym
it + α5hEiτi + α6haiτi + α7ha2
iτi + uh
it (11)
B∗
it = α0b + α1bNi,t−1 + α2bhi,t−1 + α3bHi,t−1 + α4bym
it + α5bEiτi + α6baiτi + α7ba2
iτi + ub
it
where uh
it = gh
‡
ε
f
it,ε h
it,ε b
it
·
and ub
it = gb
‡
ε
f
it,ε h
it,ε b
it
·
are composites of the original error
terms in Sit.
In order to produce a nonparametric random eﬀects bivariate probit, assume that the
gh (•) and gb (•) functions transform the original error terms so that we get the following
structure for uh
it and ub
it,
uh
it = αh
i + ξh
it (12)
ub
it = αb
i + ξb
it
9One could also adopt a speci￿cation for Pr
!
F
hb
it (Sit) > 0
"
such that a four choice multinomial probit
or logit is generated (as in Keane and Wolpin (2001a). Bivariate probits are generally more parsimonious.
13where α
j
i, j = h,b are time-invariant individual eﬀects and ξ
j
it, j = h,b are transitory
shocks. Further assume that the individual eﬀects are random with a discrete distribution
that has three mass points. That is, let uh
it and ub
it be
uh
it = θh
1A1 + θh
2A2 + ξh
it (13)
ub
it = θb
1A1 + θb
2A2 + ξb
it
where A1 is a dummy variable for unobserved "type" 1, A2 is a dummy variable for unob-
served "type" 2,a n dA0 is a dummy for unobserved "type" 0,w h i c hi st h eb a s et y p e . 10
The three type probabilities, which de￿ne the discrete nonparametric distribution of the
individual eﬀects, are given the following structure,
Pr(A1)=L1(ym
ip,E iτi)
Pr(A2)=L2(ym
ip,E iτi) (14)
Pr(A0)=1 − Pr(A1) − Pr(A2)
where Li(•), i =1 ,2 is the logistic function with diﬀerent coeﬃcients for each i.T h el o g i s t i c
function ensures that the mass point probabilities remain between zero and one. The
structure in (13) and (14) allows the individual eﬀects in (12) to have distinct distributions
(be heteroskedastic) as well as correlated.
The type probabilities in (14) are functions of permanent nonlabor income ym
ip and
education Eiτi. Permanent nonlabor income is calculated as the log of the sample average
of partner￿s annual earnings over the sample period. Because both nonlabor income and
the education are potentially endogenous, specifying the type probabilities as a function of
these variables produces a nonparametric correlated random eﬀects version of the dynamic
bivariate probit model.11
10In preliminary estimations, three types were found to ￿t the data better than two. Four types did not
produce a signi￿cant increase in the value of the log-likelihood function.
11Preliminary estimations indicated that separate permanent and transitory nonlabor income eﬀects were
hard to empirically identify when entered into both (11) and (14). The log of annual earnings was, however,
easily identi￿ed when it appeared as the only nonlabor income variable in (11), and the log of permanent
nonlabor income was easily identi￿ed when it appeared as the only nonlabor income variable in (14).
14In addition to nonparametric correlated random eﬀects, we allow the transitory shock
ξh
it in (12) to be AR(1) serially correlated. Serial correlation in ξh
it m a ya r i s e ,f o re x a m p l e ,
from unobserved female wage oﬀer shocks that persist over time.12 The transitory shocks
take the form,
ξh
it = ρξh
i,t−1 + vh
it (15)
ξb
it = ξb
it
where v
j
it, j = h,b are assumed to be independent and distributed standard normal.13
In order to address the initial conditions problem that arises in dynamic discrete choice
models in general, we employ the Heckman approximate solution (Heckman (1981)). The
Heckman approximation involves specifying H∗
it and B∗
it functions in the initial sample
period, t = τi, with no lagged endogenous state variables, distinct coeﬃcients from those
in (11), and error terms that are correlated with the error terms during the sample period.
Accordingly, we specify H∗
iτi and B∗
iτi as,
H∗
iτi = λ0h + λ1hym
iτi + λ2hEiτi + λ3haiτi + λ4ha2
iτi + uh
iτi (16)
B∗
iτi = λ0b + λ1bym
iτi + λ2bEiτi + λ3baiτi + λ4ba2
iτi + ub
iτi
where u
j
iτi, j = h,b has the same structure as in (13) but diﬀerent coeﬃcients. The errors
u
j
iτi and u
j
it j = h,b are correlated because they are functions of the same unobserved
type dummies. The variances of the transitory errors in the initial sample period are also
adjusted so that they are equal to the variances of the transitory errors during the sample
period.
Estimation of the dynamic bivariate probit model described above is diﬃcult using clas-
sical maximum likelihood techniques. Calculation of the choice probabilities with AR(1)
serially correlated errors requires multiple integration, which generally causes standard
12Following the overwhelming majority of the related literature on labor market participation, we substi-
tute out for the wage and do not incorporate observed wage data in estimation (see, e.g., Magnac (2000)).
Eckstein and Wolpin (1989) is an exception.
13At an earlier stage, we considered serial correlation in ε
b
it, which may arise from unobserved and persistent
changes in habits related to fecundity, however, identi￿cation problems arose.
15quadrature techniques to breakdown. Estimating by SML is a more computationally prac-
tical approach. The particular SML algorithm that we use to estimate the model, described
brie￿y below, was originally developed in Keane and Wolpin (2001b) for estimating the exact
decision rules of dynamic programming problems. The algorithm was shown in Keane and
Sauer (2005) to be also useful for estimating more general dynamic discrete choice models
o ft h et y p ef o r m u l a t e da b o v e .
5.2 The SML Algorithm
The SML algorithm that we employ can be outlined, for simplicity, as follows. Denote the
observed data by {h∗
i,b ∗
i,X i}
N
i=1, where h∗
i = {h∗
it}
T
t=τi is woman i￿s reported participation
history, b∗
i = {b∗
it}
T
t=τi is woman i￿s reported birth history, and Xi = {Xit}
T
t=τi is the history
of covariates. Unconditional simulation of the likelihood function proceeds in the following
way,
1.D r a w M times from the joint distribution
¡
uh
iτi,...,uh
iT,u b
iτi,...,u b
iT
¢
,f o re a c hw o m a ni,
to form the correlated error sequences
‰n'
uh
itm
“T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
and
‰n'
ub
itm
“T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
.
This involves drawing uniform and standard normal variates according to (13), (14),
and (15).
2. Given
n
{Xit}
T
t=τi
oN
i=1
,
‰n
{um
it}
T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
,a n d
‰n'
ub
itm
“T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
,c o n s t r u c t
M simulated participation histories,
‰n
{hm
it}
T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
,a n dM simulated birth
histories,
‰n
{bm
it}
T
t=τi
oN
i=1
￿M
m=1
for each woman i, according to (11) and (16) where
hm
it = I (H∗m
it > 0) and bm
it = I (B∗m
it > 0).
3. Construct the classi￿cation error rates
‰n
πh
jktm
oT
t=τi
￿M
m=1
and
‰n
πb
jktm
oT
t=τi
￿M
m=1
for each woman i (see below), where j denotes the simulated choice hm
it (bm
it)a n dk
denotes the reported choice h∗
it (b∗
it).
4. Form an unbiased simulator of the likelihood contribution for each woman i as:
16b P (h∗
i,b ∗
i | θ,Xi)=
1
M
M X
m=1
T Y
t=τi





1 X
j=0
1 X
k=0
πh
jktmI [hm
it = j,h∗
it = k]






1 X
j=0
1 X
k=0
πb
jktmI [bm
it = j,b∗
it = k]





(17)
where θ is the vector of model parameters.
The two classi￿cation error rates (out of the four that appear in (17))t h a ta r ee s t i m a t e d
along with the other parameters of the model are
π01tm = πh
01tm = πb
01tm =P r( h∗
it =1| hm
it =0 )=P r( b∗
it =1| bm
it =0 ) (18)
π10tm = πh
10tm = πb
10tm =P r( h∗
it =0| hm
it =1 )=P r( b∗
it =0| bm
it =1 )
where π00tm =1− π01tm and π11tm =1− π10tm. Note that the probability of reporting
a particular choice is allowed to be a function of the true (simulated) choice but is not
directly aﬀected by covariates. Classi￿cation error in reported participation status is also
assumed to be independent of classi￿cation error in reported birth outcomes, and both are
constrained to occur at the same rate.14 The classi￿cation error rates in (17) are given a
logistic form to ensure that the probabilities remain between zero and one. For more details
on the algorithm, a discussion of identi￿cation, and an illustration of the biases that arise if
classi￿cation error is not accounted for in non-linear discrete choice models, see Keane and
Sauer (2006).
6 Estimation Results
6.1 Point Estimates and Standard Errors
Table 4 reports selected SML estimates of the dynamic bivariate probit model speci￿ed in
the previous section.15 Additional parameterizations in the model, not mentioned earlier,
14Distinct classi￿cation error rates for participation and birth outcomes were hard to empirically identify.
15The data for 2001 (wave 8) are not included in estimation due to incomplete fertility information in that
year.
17are the splitting of the education variable Eiτiinto two dummies, Es
iτi and Et
iτi representing
achievement of secondary and tertiary levels of education, respectively (as in Table 1). The
stock of children at the beginning of period t, Nit, is also split into two dummy variables.
One dummy is for the youngest child being three years of age or less and the other is for
the youngest child being older than three. The base category is no children at all (also as in
Table 1). In addition, the H∗
it and B∗
it functions in (11) and (16) are augmented to include
y e a ra n dr e g i o ne ﬀects within each country.
The ￿rst two columns of Table 4 present the estimation results for France. Column
(1) reveals a negative eﬀect of nonlabor income and a negative eﬀect of the youngest child
being three years of age or less on labor market participation. Both eﬀects are precisely
estimated. Secondary and tertiary levels of education have signi￿cant positive eﬀects on
labor market participation. Participation in the previous period has a strong positive impact
on participation in the current period, even controlling for accumulated potential experience
before the start of the sample period and accumulated actual experience during the sample
period, indicating an important role for state dependence.
The importance of permanent unobserved heterogeneity is revealed by the strong and
precisely estimated coeﬃcients on the unobserved type dummies, A1 and A2.T y p e 1
women are more likely to participate in the labor market relative to type 0 women, and
type 2 women are less likely to participate in the labor market relative to type 0 women.
The estimated AR(1) serial correlation coeﬃcient also suggests nonnegligible dynamics in
transitory unobservables.
The estimates in Column (2) show that the presence of very young children as well
as older children signi￿cantly decrease the propensity to give birth. Having achieved a
tertiary level of education signi￿cantly increases the propensity to give birth. There are
also important unobserved heterogeneity eﬀects. Type 1 women are more likely to give
birth (and work) than type 0 women. Type 2 women are more likely to give birth (but less
likely to work) than type 0 women.
The estimated type probabilities for France, shown at the bottom of Columns (1) and (2),
indicate that, on average, type 1 and 2 women account for three-quarters of the population,
with type 1 individuals being the majority, 53%. Nonlabor income and education have
18signi￿cant eﬀects on a woman￿s unobserved type (not shown in the table). The signi￿cance
of these variables implies that nonlabor income and education are endogenous, and that it
was important to account for this in estimation (albeit indirectly).
The estimated classi￿cation error rates for France, shown below the estimated type
probabilities, reveal that the probability of reporting to be participating in the labor market,
when the true state is nonparticipation, is .065. The probability of reporting to be not
participating, when the true state is participation, is .021.16 Although small in magnitude,
both classi￿cation error rates are signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero. Note that ignoring even a
small amount of classi￿cation error can lead to large biases in the importance of unobserved
heterogeneity and state dependence.17
Columns (3) − (6) display the corresponding results for Italy and Spain, respectively.
The point estimates are, qualitatively, similar to those reported in Columns (1) and (2) for
France. Interestingly, the same pattern of coeﬃc i e n t so nt h et y p ed u m m i e sa r eo b t a i n e di n
both the work and birth equations. Previous participation status is also very important, as
is serial correlation in the transitory errors. In contrast to France, in both Italy and Spain,
accumulated actual work experience signi￿cantly decreases the propensity to give birth.
There are also diﬀerences in the type proportions in the population, indicating signi￿cantly
diﬀerent distributions of permanent unobserved heterogeneity across the three countries.
Nonlabor income and education also signi￿cantly aﬀect the type probabilities in Italy and
Spain. The classi￿cation error rates for Italy and Spain are similarly small in magnitude
but signi￿cantly diﬀerent from zero, as for France.
6.2 Linearized Marginal Eﬀects and Relative Importance Decomposition
The top panel of Table 5 reports selected marginal eﬀects, corresponding to the point esti-
mates reported in Table 4. The marginal eﬀects are calculated in the following way. First,
stochastic elements of the model are drawn from their estimated distributions (as in the
16As mentioned earlier, the classi￿cation error rates for reported birth outcomes are constrained to be
equal to the classi￿cation error rates for reported participation outcomes.
17T h i si ss h o w ni nK e a n ea n dS a u e r(2006) who obtain classi￿cation error rates for labor market partici-
pation of similar magnitudes.
19SML algorithm described earlier). Second, participation and birth outcomes are simulated
according to the estimated approximate decision rules. Third, separate linear regressions
of simulated outcomes on all of the variables appearing in the model are estimated. The
marginal eﬀects are thus linear approximations.
The estimated marginal eﬀects clearly illustrate the overriding importance of previous
participation status (state dependence) for determining current participation status in all
three countries. Having participated in the labor market in the previous period increases
the probability of participating in the current period by 66 percentage points in France, 82
percentage points in Italy, and 78 percentage points in Spain. The marginal eﬀects of the
type dummies (permanent unobserved heterogeneity) are relatively smaller, but show the
type dummies to be the next most important determinants of participation. Interestingly,
education has a similar marginal eﬀect to the presence of young children, although opposite
in sign. For birth outcomes, age (not shown) and the presence of children are the strongest
determinants. Unobserved type and education come next in the hierarchy.
An additional way to measure the relative importance of the factors determining labor
market participation and birth outcomes is to add diﬀerent sets of variables to the linear
regressions on the simulated data, and examine the changes in the adjusted R-squared. The
results of this exercise are reported in the bottom panel of Table 5. The base speci￿cation for
both the work and birth equations includes only the observed covariates (nonlabor income,
fertility outcome dummies, age and education dummies).
The adjusted R-squared when only observed covariates are included in the participation
equation, R
2
1,i sq u i t el o w .R
2
1 is .06 in France, .13 in Italy and .14 in Spain. Adding the ￿xed
eﬀects (year and region dummies) to the base speci￿cation yields a R
2
2 which is only slightly
higher than R
2
1. Adding the value of the simulated serially correlated shock only to the
base speci￿cation has a more substantial eﬀect. R
2
3 reaches .16 in France, .26 in Italy, and
.27 in Spain. Adding only the type dummies (unobserved heterogeneity) yields a relatively
more substantial increase in the adjusted R-squared. R
2
4 increases to .53 in France, .48
in Italy and ..39 in Spain. Adding both accumulated actual labor market experience and
previous year￿s participation status produces the greatest increase in the adjust R-squared.
R
2
5 jumps to .77 in France, .89 in Italy and .85 in Spain.
20According to the way we perform a relative importance decomposition, state dependence
is clearly the most important factor in explaining the persistence in participation status.
State dependence is also relatively more important in Italy and Spain than in France. The
corresponding exercise for birth outcomes shows, in contrast, that the observable covari-
ates (including age and fertility) and unobserved heterogeneity are the most important
determinants of the propensity to give birth.
7 Discussion
The estimation results presented in the previous section reveal substantial cross-country
variation in both the level of female labor market participation and the extent of state
dependence. In particular, we ￿nd that state dependence is stronger in Italy and Spain
(where labor market participation rates are relatively lower) compared to France, while
unobserved heterogeneity is relatively more important in France than it is in Italy and Spain.
While it is true that some of the cross-country diﬀerences in the relative importance of state
dependence and unobserved heterogeneity may re￿ect cultural attitudes regarding gender
roles, they may also re￿ect systematic diﬀerences in the institutional constraints faced by
individuals. Given the relative homogeneity of the three countries under consideration, we
believe the second aspect is likely to be the most important.
In the next subsection, we analyze a set of aggregate statistics on employment pro-
tection, part-time work availability and child care in France, Italy and Spain, and note a
connection between these statistics and the pattern of state dependence eﬀects estimated
in the model. In the second subsection, we use the estimated approximate decision rules to
perform additional simulations. Speci￿cally, we quantify the eﬀect of the institutional envi-
ronment on participation and fertility choices by examining how these choices would change
if women in one country were to face the institutional constraints (estimated decision rule
parameters) of another country.
217.1 Labor Market Rigidities and Inadequate Child Care Options
The constraints faced by individuals in the three countries under consideration can be read-
ily compared through aggregate statistics on employment protection, part-time work avail-
ability and child care. Consider ￿rst the employment protection index. The employment
protection index ranks countries on the basis of employment protection legislation (EPL),
i.e., on the basis of regulations governing individual dismissals and hiring of workers (e.g.,
severance pay and advance notice). Theoretical models clearly indicate that employment
should be more stable and individual employment relationships more durable when EPL is
stricter. Given a constant cyclical wage pattern, higher ￿ring costs stabilize employment in
downturns but also deter employers from hiring in upturns. To the extent that ￿ring costs
prevent termination of existing employment relationships, sharp employment reduction is
less likely in countries with stringent job security provisions. Stricter EPL should, therefore,
be associated not only with lower labor market participation rates, but also stronger state
dependence eﬀects.
Column (1) of Table 6 shows a ranking of Italy, Spain and France in terms of EPL.
The ranking does not reveal sharp diﬀerences between the three countries, but Italy does
have a higher index score as well as the greatest degree of estimated state dependence.
Column (2) compares the three countries according to the proportion of workers employed
in part-time jobs. The proportion of workers employed in part-time jobs can be considered
an indication of labor market ￿exibility. In more ￿exible labor markets, one would expect
less state dependence, i.e., more movements in and out of unemployment. According to this
latter measure, there are much sharper diﬀerences between the countries. Italy and Spain
are similar, while France is much more ￿exible. This is highly consistent with the pattern
of estimated state dependence eﬀects in the model. Italy and Spain have relatively lower
proportions of individuals employed part-time and stronger state dependence coeﬃcients
(marginal eﬀects) than France.
Diﬀerences between Italy, Spain and France, consistent with the pattern of estimated
state dependence eﬀects, also arise when we consider child care outcomes. Column (3)
reports the percentage of children less than three years of age in child care. Italy and Spain
have very low percentages, while in France the percentage is considerably higher. Column
22(4) compares the average opening hours of child care (for children less than three years
of age). France has greater availability of child care on this measure as well. Column (5)
compares child bene￿ts as a percentage of GDP. The French percentage far exceeds the
percentages in Italy and Spain, which are both less than 1%o fG D P . 18
The data in Table 6 clearly indicate that in Italy and Spain, relative to France, both
market and nonmarket options for working mothers are more limited. Part-time work is
in relatively scarce supply, bene￿ts for families with children are much lower, and child
care services are typically inadequate in quantity and characterized by extreme rigidity
in the number of weekly hours available (Del Boca (2002)). Women that decide to bear
a child either do not withdraw from the labor market or never re-enter after childbirth.
Moreover, women that are employed tend to have full-time work commitments, which is
not compatible with having many children, so overall fertility is lower (Boeri, Del Boca
and Pissarides (2005)). Thus, countries with less labor market ￿exibility and less family
friendly policies have individuals concentrated more often in the always work and never
work categories. The costs of changing employment from one period to the next are higher,
generating a greater extent of state dependence in female labor market participation.
7.2 Measuring the Eﬀect of the Institutional Environment
In Table 7, we report the results of a simulation exercise which further quanti￿es the in-
￿uence of the institutional environment on labor market participation and birth rates. In
the simulation, predicted participation and birth outcomes are generated for each women in
one country, using the SML estimates of the approximate decision rules for an alternative
country. The results of the counterfactual exercise are partial equilibrium only, in the sense
that the background characteristics (education, nonlabor income, etc.) are assumed to re-
main the same after changing the institutional environment. In order to partially address
this problem, the eﬀects of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and serial correlation are
neutralized in the simulation.
In the top panel of Table 7, Italian and Spanish women face the estimated French decision
18The extension of Allocation Parentale d￿ ·Education (APE) to births of parity 2 in 1994 is often cited
as a cause of the recent growth in fertility (Laroque and Salanie (2005)).
23rule parameters (institutional environment). The results indicate that if Italian women,
who have not completed secondary education, were to make work and birth decisions in the
relatively more ￿exible French institutional environment, they would increase their average
participation rate over the sample period by 17.5 percentage points. However, their average
birth rate would increase by a negligible 0.3 percentage points. Among Italian women who
have completed secondary education, the participation rate would increase by relatively
less, 3.8 percentage points, and the birth rate would decrease by a negligible amount (0.2
percentage points). The main advantage of the more ￿exible French environment would be
much a higher average employment rate among less educated Italian women.
If Spanish women were to face the more ￿exible French institutional environment, the
participation rate of less educated women would increase by a very large 29.4 percentage
points. More educated women would also increase their participation rate by a substantial
amount (21.9 percentage points). The increase in the average birth rate among less educated
Spanish women would be a negligible 0.1 percentage points, but more educated Spanish
women would increase their average birth rate by a nonnegligible 2.1 percentage points. In
contrast to Italian women, both less educated and more highly educated Spanish women
would increase their average labor market participation rate were they to face the French
institutional environment, and more educated women would increase their average birth
rate.
The two bottom panels of Table 7 perform the analogous experiments of having French
a n dS p a n i s hw o m e nf a c et h eI t a l i a np a r a m e t e r s ,a n dF r e n c ha n dI t a l i a nw o m e nf a c et h e
Spanish parameters. The results are mostly symmetric. French women would decrease their
average participation rates in the Italian and Spanish institutional environments, and Span-
i s hw o m e nw o u l db e n e ￿t, in terms of employment outcomes, from the Italian institutional
environment.
8C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we formulated a dynamic utility maximization model of female labor force
participation and fertility choices and estimated approximate decision rules using data from
24t h eE C H Po nm a r r i e dw o m e ni nI t a l y ,S p a i na n dF r a n c e . F o c u s i n go nas m a l ls e to fc u l -
turally similar countries helps isolate the underlying institutional causes of cross-country
variation in the relative importance of permanent unobserved heterogeneity and state de-
pendence in female labor market participation decisions. The estimation results indicate
that state dependence is the most important factor in determining life cycle female labor
supply in each of the three countries. State dependence eﬀects are stronger in Italy and
Spain relative to France, and the estimated pattern of state dependence eﬀects is highly
consistent with the diﬀerential availability of part-time employment opportunities and child
care across the three countries.
Our study suggests that more severe labor market rigidities and relatively more inad-
equate child care options are important underlying sources of state dependence in female
labor supply behavior. This is in addition to the "usual suspects" of human capital accu-
mulation and search costs that depend on employment status. We also quantify the eﬀects
of the institutional environment by simulating counterfactual female participation and birth
outcomes when women in one country face the institutional environment (approximate de-
cision rule parameters) of a diﬀerent country. The results of the simulation indicate that
Italian and Spanish women would substantially increase their average participation rates
were they to face the relatively more ￿exible French employment and child care environment.
25Table 1
Descriptive Statistics by Employment Pattern and Country
Italy Spain France
Work Work Full Work Work Full Work Work Full
0y e a r s 8y e a r s s a m p l e 0y e a r s 8y e a r s s a m p l e 0y e a r s 8y e a r s s a m p l e
Age 38.34 38.53 38.31 37.78 38.53 37.77 37.47 38.07 37.13
(5.33) (4.85) (5.19) (5.53) (5.29) (5.51) (5.60) (5.48) (5.78)
Tertiary .02 .16. 0 8.09 .46 .20 .16. 3 6. 2 8
Education
Secondary .31 .73 .52 .27 .71 .39 .56 .80 .73
Education
Youngest .11 .10. 10 .12. 11 .11 .15. 11 .14
Child 0-3
Youngest .88 .78 .82 .84 .80 .82 .78 .77 .74
Child >3
Male 16.56 17.45 16.91 17.34 21.70 17.74 20.56 21.34 20.51
Earnings (7.66) (7.66) (7.54) (9.05) (13.24) (9.98) (16.22) (24.46) (19.21)
Birth .041 .040 .042 .052 050 .050 .065 .049 .065
Rate
Work 0 1 .48 0 1 .34 0 1 .67
Rate
N 324 302 830 327 153 713 166 447 993
Note: Means are calculated over eight years of data for each women and over all women in the
sample. Standard deviations of the continuous variables are in parentheses.
26Figure 1
Annual Participation Rates by Country (1994-2001)
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Note: Survey wave 1 corresponds to the year 1994 and survey wave 8 corresponds to the year
2001.
27Figure 2
Annual Birth Rates by Country (1994-2000)
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Note: Survey wave 1 corresponds to the year 1994 and survey wave 7 corresponds to the year
2000. The data on birth outcomes for survey wave 8 (year 2001) are not complete and, therefore,
not considered.
28Table 2
Distribution of Years Worked by Country
(Column Percentages)
Work Years Italy Spain France
0 .390 .459 .167
1 .043 .094 .044
2 .037 .056 .037
3 .039 .048 .043
4 .034 .042 .041
5 .024 .030 .054
6 .028 .028 .066
7 .041 .030 .097
8 .364 .215. 4 5 0
1.000 1.000 1.000
29Table 3
Employment Transitions by Country
(Row Percentages)
Italy
Work in t
Work in t-1 0 1
0 .933 .067
1 .063 .937
Spain
Work in t
Work in t-1 0 1
0 .925 .075
1 .111 .889
France
Work in t
Work in t-1 0 1
0 .838 .162
1 .068 .868
30Table 4
Selected SML Point Estimates and Standard Errors
France Italy Spain
Work Birth Work Birth Work Birth
(1)( 2 )( 3 )( 4 )( 5 )( 6 )
log(ym
it ) −.3623 .0818 −.3782 .0854 −.4556 .0637
(.0515) (.0792) (.0590) (.0493) (.0667) (.1032)
ychildit <=3 −.7366 −1.2369 −.3982 −1.2533 −.5711 −1.2188
(.1176) (.1525) (.1994) (.2090) (.1754) (.2433)
ychildit > 3 .0007 −.4963 −.4077 −.5734 −.1195 −.5768
(.0962) (.1240) (.1418) (.1516) (.1244) (.1842)
Es
iτi .7814 .1514 2.0501 .3800 1.1410 .0899
(.0783) (.1191) (.0855) (.1133) (.1246) (.2156)
Et
iτi .9280 .6013 1.3016 .6311 1.2949 .6163
(.0750) (.1075) (.1513) (.2066) (.1483) (.2545)
Hit .0777 −.0474 .2377 −.0872 .2987 −.2325
(.0424) (.0466) (.0444) (.0492) (.0520) (.0713)
hit−1 1.7499 −.0357 2.1426 .1359 1.8681 .0336
(.0835) (.1373) (.1170) (.1571) (.1390) (.2140)
A1 1.6432 1.1187 2.0312 1.2444 1.6137 1.0539
(.0993) (.1282) (.1327) (.2357) (.1897) (.3098)
A2 −1.3122 1.0689 −1.4669 1.0359 −1.3456 1.3129
(.1172) (.1409) (.1383) (.2354) (.2062) (.3158)
ρ. 5933 − .7778 − .7361 −
(.0341) (.0127) (.0237)
Pr(A1),Pr(A2)( .5382,.2237) (.3300,.5444) (.4753,.3818)
π11,π00 (.0648,.0210) (.0472,.0167) (.0669,.0241)
Log-Likelihood −4092.48 −2652.73 −2474.69
N 993 830 713
Note: All speci￿cations also include a quadratic in age, year and region dummies.
31Table 5
Selected Marginal Eﬀects and Relative Importance Decomposition
France Italy Spain
Work Birth Work Birth Work Birth
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Marginal Eﬀects
log(ym
it ) −.023 −.000 −.015 .006 −.022 .002
ychildit <=3 −.056 −.154 −.014 −.103 −.027 −.100
ychildit > 3 .002 −.078 −.014 −.057 −.004 −.064
Es
iτ .049 .004 .059 .016 .043 .007
Et
iτ .055 .057 .047 .022 .053 .022
A1 .127 .058 .063 .035 .073 .026
A2 −.146 .055 −.056 .024 −.043 .043
Hit .001 −.003 .002 −.003 .009 −.004
hi,t−1 .656 −.005 .816 .004 .779 −.006
Relative Importance
R
2
1 (base X￿s) .060 .117 .128 .075 .136 .064
R
2
2 (X￿s + ￿xed eﬀects) .063 .133 .143 .084 .142 .072
R
2
3 (X￿s + epsilon) .159 − .260 − .274 −
R
2
4 (X￿s + type dummies) .529 .143 .478 .087 .392 .082
R
2
5 (X￿s + state dependence) .774 .133 .887 .084 .850 .077
N 993 830 713
Note: Base X￿s include nonlabor income, fertility, age, and education. The ￿xed eﬀects are
year and region dummies. State dependence includes both accumulated actual work experience and
lagged participation status.
32Table 6
Employment Protection and Child Care
Employment Part Time % Child Child Care Child Bene￿ts
Country Protection Index Work Care (<3) Opening hours (% GDP)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Italy 1.5 17.4 7 8 0.9
Spain 1.4 17.2 5 6 0.4
France 1.4 31.0 39 10 2.8
Note: The Employment Protection Index is derived from Blanchard and Wolfers (2000). The
data on public child care and child care bene￿ts are drawn from the OECD, Eurostat, and Fondazione
Innocenti statistics.
33Table 7
Simulated Eﬀect of Institutional Environment on Women￿s Work and Birth
Decisions
Less than HS Educ. More than HS Educ.
% Point Change % Point Change
in Rate of in Rate of
Participation Birth Participation Birth
French Parameters
Italian Women 17.5 0.3 3.8 -0.2
Spanish Women 29.4 0.1 21.9 2.1
Italian Parameters
French Women -17.8 -0.4 -0.5 -0.4
Spanish Women 12.0 -0.3 21.7 2.3
Spanish Parameters
French Women -30.0 -0.1 -24.0 -2.1
Italian Women -12.4 0.2 -24.3 -1.3
Note: The numbers in parentheses are the simulated percentage point changes assuming no permanent
unobserved heterogeneity or transitory serial correlation.
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